



CLAUSE 4.6 REQUEST TO FORESHORE BUILDING LINE

179 Riverview Road,
Avalon Beach

Suite 1, 9 Narabang Way Belrose NSW 2085

Phone: (02) 9986 2535 | Fax: (02) 9986 3050 |

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4.6 Request to Vary Development Standard

Proposed New Dwelling with Inclinorator

179 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach

William Fleming

MPLAN

Suite 1/9 Narabang Way
Belrose NSW 2085

Tel: (02) 99862535

May 2024

1.0 Introduction

This clause 4.6 variation request has been prepared in support of a foreshore building line (FBL) breach associated with a development application proposing the construction of a new dwelling house on the subject allotment. In the preparation of this variation request consideration has been given to architectural plans prepared by Madeline Blanchfield Architects.

This clause 4.6 variation has been prepared having regard to the Land and Environment Court judgements in the matters of *Wehbe v Pittwater Council* [2007] NSWLEC 827 (*Wehbe*) at [42] – [48], *Four2Five Pty Ltd v Ashfield Council* [2015] NSWCA 248, *Initial Action Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council* [2018] NSWLEC 118, *Baron Corporation Pty Limited v Council of the City of Sydney* [2019] NSWLEC 61, and *RebelMH Neutral Bay Pty Limited v North Sydney Council* [2019] NSWCA 130.

2.0 Pittwater Local Environmental Plan 2014 (PLEP)

2.1 Clause 7.8 – Development within the Foreshore Area

Clause 7.8(2) of PLEP 2014 states that development consent must not be granted for development on land within the foreshore area (being the land between the foreshore building line and the mean high water mark) except for the following purposes:

- (a) *the extension, alteration or rebuilding of an existing building wholly or partly in the foreshore area, but only if the development will not result in the footprint of the building extending further into the foreshore area,*
- (b) *boat sheds, sea retaining walls, wharves, slipways, jetties, waterway access stairs, swimming pools, fences, cycleways, walking trails, picnic facilities or other recreation facilities (outdoors).*

The foreshore building line control is a fixed standard relating to the siting of buildings on a site, consistent with the definition of a development standard as defined by the EP&A Act. As such, the provisions of clause 4.6 of PLEP 2014 can be applied.

Pursuant to clause 4.6(2) of PLEP 2014, consent may be granted for development even though the proposal contravenes a development standard prescribed by an environmental planning instrument. Whilst this clause does not apply to those standards expressly excluded from this clause, the foreshore building line development standard of clause 7.8 of PLEP 2014 is not expressly excluded and thus, the provisions of clause 4.6 can be applied in this instance.

The development application seeks consent for the construction of an inclinor associated with the new dwelling proposed, part of which is proposed within the foreshore area. The inclinor is shown on the plans provided by the architect.

2.2 Clause 4.6 – Exceptions to Development Standards

Clause 4.6(1) of PLEP provides:

- (1) *The objectives of this clause are:*
 - (a) *to provide an appropriate degree of flexibility in applying certain development standards to particular development, and*
 - (b) *to achieve better outcomes for and from development by allowing flexibility in particular circumstances.*

The decision of Chief Justice Preston in *Initial Action Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council* [2018] NSWLEC 118 (“Initial Action”) provides guidance in respect of the operation of clause 4.6 subject to the clarification by the NSW Court of Appeal in *RebelMH Neutral Bay Pty Limited v North Sydney Council* [2019] NSWCA 130 at [1], [4] & [51] where the Court confirmed that properly construed, a consent authority has to be satisfied that an applicant’s written request has in fact demonstrated the matters required to be demonstrated by cl 4.6(3).

Initial Action involved an appeal pursuant to s56A of the Land & Environment Court Act 1979 against the decision of a Commissioner.

At [90] of *Initial Action* the Court held that:

“In any event, cl 4.6 does not give substantive effect to the objectives of the clause in cl 4.6(1)(a) or (b). There is no provision that requires compliance with the objectives of the clause. In particular, neither cl 4.6(3) nor (4) expressly or impliedly requires that development that contravenes a development standard “achieve better outcomes for and from development”. If objective (b) was the source of the Commissioner’s test that non-compliant development should achieve a better environmental planning outcome for the site relative to a compliant development, the Commissioner was mistaken. Clause 4.6 does not impose that test.”

The legal consequence of the decision in *Initial Action* is that clause 4.6(1) is not an operational provision and that the remaining clauses of clause 4.6 constitute the operational provisions.

Clause 4.6(2) of PLEP provides:

- (2) *Development consent may, subject to this clause, be granted for development even though the development would contravene a development standard imposed by this or any other environmental planning instrument. However, this clause does not apply to a development standard that is expressly excluded from the operation of this clause.*

This clause applies to the clause 7.8 FBL Development Standard.

Clause 4.6(3) of PLEP provides:

- (3) *Development consent must not be granted for development that contravenes a development standard unless the consent authority has considered a written request from the applicant that seeks to justify the contravention of the development standard by demonstrating:*
- (a) *that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, and*
 - (b) *that there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard.*

The proposed development does not comply with the FBL provision at 7.8 of PLEP which limits development within the foreshore area however strict compliance is considered to be unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of this case and there are considered to be sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard.

The relevant arguments are set out later in this written request.

Clause 4.6(4) of PLEP provides:

- (4) *Development consent must not be granted for development that contravenes a development standard unless:*
- (a) *the consent authority is satisfied that:*
 - (i) *the applicant's written request has adequately addressed the matters required to be demonstrated by subclause (3), and*
 - (ii) *the proposed development will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the particular standard and the objectives for development within the zone in which the development is proposed to be carried out, and*
 - (b) *the concurrence of the Director-General has been obtained.*

In *Initial Action* the Court found that clause 4.6(4) required the satisfaction of two preconditions ([14] & [28]). The first precondition is found in clause 4.6(4)(a). That precondition requires the formation of two positive opinions of satisfaction by the consent authority. The first positive opinion of satisfaction (cl 4.6(4)(a)(i)) is that the applicant's written request has adequately addressed the matters required to be demonstrated by clause 4.6(3)(a)(i) (*Initial Action* at [25]).

The second positive opinion of satisfaction (cl 4.6(4)(a)(ii)) is that the proposed development will be in the public interest **because** it is consistent with the objectives of the development standard and the objectives for development of the zone in which

the development is proposed to be carried out (*Initial Action* at [27]). The second precondition is found in clause 4.6(4)(b). The second precondition requires the consent authority to be satisfied that the concurrence of the Secretary (of the Department of Planning and the Environment) has been obtained (*Initial Action* at [28]).

Under cl 64 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2021*, the Secretary has given written notice dated 5th May 2020, attached to the Planning Circular PS 18-003 issued on 5th May 2020, to each consent authority, that it may assume the Secretary's concurrence for exceptions to development standards in respect of applications made under cl 4.6, subject to the conditions in the table in the notice.

Clause 4.6(5) of PLEP provides:

- (5) *In deciding whether to grant concurrence, the Director-General must consider:*
- (a) *whether contravention of the development standard raises any matter of significance for State or regional environmental planning, and*
 - (b) *the public benefit of maintaining the development standard, and*
 - (c) *any other matters required to be taken into consideration by the Director-General before granting concurrence.*

Clause 4.6(6) relates to subdivision and is not relevant to the development. Clause 4.6(7) is administrative and requires the consent authority to keep a record of its assessment of the clause 4.6 variation. Clause 4.6(8) is only relevant so as to note that it does not exclude clause 7.8 of PLEP from the operation of clause 4.6.

3.0 Relevant Case Law

In *Initial Action* the Court summarised the legal requirements of clause 4.6 and confirmed the continuing relevance of previous case law at [13] to [29]. In particular the Court confirmed that the five common ways of establishing that compliance with a development standard might be unreasonable and unnecessary as identified in *Wehbe v Pittwater Council* (2007) 156 LGERA 446; [2007] NSWLEC 827 continue to apply as follows:

17. *The first and most commonly invoked way is to establish that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary because the objectives of the development standard are achieved notwithstanding non-compliance with the standard: Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [42] and [43].*
18. *A second way is to establish that the underlying objective or purpose is not relevant to the development with the consequence that compliance is unnecessary: Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [45].*

19. *A third way is to establish that the underlying objective or purpose would be defeated or thwarted if compliance was required with the consequence that compliance is unreasonable: Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [46].*
20. *A fourth way is to establish that the development standard has been virtually abandoned or destroyed by the Council's own decisions in granting development consents that depart from the standard and hence compliance with the standard is unnecessary and unreasonable: Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [47].*
21. *A fifth way is to establish that the zoning of the particular land on which the development is proposed to be carried out was unreasonable or inappropriate so that the development standard, which was appropriate for that zoning, was also unreasonable or unnecessary as it applied to that land and that compliance with the standard in the circumstances of the case would also be unreasonable or unnecessary: Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [48]. However, this fifth way of establishing that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary is limited, as explained in Wehbe v Pittwater Council at [49]-[51]. The power under cl 4.6 to dispense with compliance with the development standard is not a general planning power to determine the appropriateness of the development standard for the zoning or to effect general planning changes as an alternative to the strategic planning powers in Part 3 of the EPA Act.*
22. *These five ways are not exhaustive of the ways in which an applicant might demonstrate that compliance with a development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary; they are merely the most commonly invoked ways. An applicant does not need to establish all of the ways. It may be sufficient to establish only one way, although if more ways are applicable, an applicant can demonstrate that compliance is unreasonable or unnecessary in more than one way.*

The relevant steps identified in *Initial Action* (and the case law referred to in *Initial Action*) can be summarised as follows:

1. Is clause 7.8 of PLEP a development standard?
2. Is the consent authority satisfied that this written request adequately addresses the matters required by clause 4.6(3) by demonstrating that:
 - (a) compliance is unreasonable or unnecessary; and
 - (b) there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard
3. Is the consent authority satisfied that the proposed development will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of clause 7.8 and the objectives for development for in the zone?

4. Has the concurrence of the Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment been obtained?
5. Where the consent authority is the Court, has the Court considered the matters in clause 4.6(5) when exercising the power to grant development consent for the development that contravenes clause 7.8 of PLEP?

4.0 Request for variation

4.1 Is clause 7.8 of PLEP a development standard?

The definition of “development standard” at clause 1.4 of the EP&A Act includes a provision of an environmental planning instrument or the regulations in relation to the carrying out of development, being provisions by or under which requirements are specified or standards are fixed in respect of any aspect of that development, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, requirements or standards in respect of:

- (c) *the character, location, siting, bulk, scale, shape, size, height, density, design or external appearance of a building or work,*

Clause 7.8 PLEP limits development within the FBL. Accordingly, clause 7.8 PLEP is a development standard.

4.2A Clause 4.6(3)(a) – Whether compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary

The common approach for an applicant to demonstrate that compliance with a development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary are set out in *Wehbe v Pittwater Council* [2007] NSWLEC 827.

The first option, which has been adopted in this case, is to establish that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable and unnecessary because the objectives of the development standard are achieved notwithstanding non-compliance with the standard.

Consistency with objectives of the FBL standard

An assessment as to the consistency of the proposal when assessed against the objectives of the standard is as follows:

- (a) *to ensure that development in the foreshore area will not impact on natural foreshore processes or affect the significance and amenity of the area,*

Response: The natural foreshore process will not be impacted by the inclinator and will be distanced from the waterfront area and potential wave/tidal inundation or erosion of the foreshore area.

The inclinator and its rail will not have an unreasonable impact on the scenic qualities of the foreshore area. It is modest in scale with it only running from the foreshore area to the rear of the dwelling as opposed to the entire length of the site. In this regard, the modest scale, in comparison to more recently approved and existing inclinators in the immediate area, does not give rise to any adverse visual impacts. Council can be satisfied that the proposed inclinator rail will not adversely impact the visual qualities of the foreshore area, noting that the track is limited in width, is located low to the ground and will be finished in earthy tones to blend with surrounding vegetation. The inclinator has been sited to avoid adverse impacts upon vegetation and disturbance of rock outcrops

Overall, the consent authority can be satisfied that the proposed development will not impact on natural foreshore processes or affect the significance and amenity of the foreshore area.

- (b) *to ensure continuous public access along the foreshore area and to the waterway.*

Response: No impact to public access notwithstanding that the individual circumstances of the site does not lend itself to providing continuous access along the foreshore area.

4.2B Clause 4.6(4)(b) – Are there sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard?

In Initial Action the Court found at [23]-[24] that:

23. *As to the second matter required by cl 4.6(3)(b), the grounds relied on by the applicant in the written request under cl 4.6 must be “environmental planning grounds” by their nature: see Four2Five Pty Ltd v Ashfield Council [2015] NSWLEC 90 at [26]. The adjectival phrase “environmental planning” is not defined, but would refer to grounds that relate to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the EPA Act, including the objects in s 1.3 of the EPA Act.*
24. *The environmental planning grounds relied on in the written request under cl 4.6 must be “sufficient”. There are two respects in which the written request needs to be “sufficient”. First, the environmental planning grounds advanced in the written request must be sufficient “to justify contravening the development standard”. The focus of cl 4.6(3)(b) is on the aspect or element of the development that contravenes the development standard, not on the development as a whole, and why that contravention is justified on environmental planning grounds.*

*The environmental planning grounds advanced in the written request must justify the contravention of the development standard, not simply promote the benefits of carrying out the development as a whole: see *Four2Five Pty Ltd v Ashfield Council* [2015] NSWCA 248 at [15]. Second, the written request must demonstrate that there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard so as to enable the consent authority to be satisfied under cl 4.6(4)(a)(i) that the written request has adequately addressed this matter: see *Four2Five Pty Ltd v Ashfield Council* [2015] NSWLEC 90 at [31].*

Sufficient environmental planning grounds

Topography & Access

The rear of the site is steeply sloping with a sheer rock outcrop at the rear of the dwelling. Currently the access to the waterfront is via winding stairs that are dilapidated and not fit for purpose. These stairs are proposed to be replaced however does not provide convenient and easy access for the elderly or people with a disability. The owners are seeking to 'age in place' and the inclinator is the only option in providing safe and convenient access to the waterfront.

The inclinator is also intended to be able to transport items from the dwelling to the waterfront and jetty. The access stairs would not facilitate easy transportation of item from the dwelling to the waterfront. As such, the inclinator is integral to the amenity and functionality of their waterfront private open space and recreational uses.

Orderly Development

It is noted that safe and contemporary access to the waterfront via an inclinator was sufficient environmental planning grounds with this type of development in relation to recent approvals. The recent approvals relate to:

- DA2023/0588 at 161 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2018/2051 and Mod2022/0342 at 135 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2022/0281 at 167 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2021/1522 at 189 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2021/0256 at 26A Hudson Parade, Avalon Beach
- DA2019/0565 at 129 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2018/2015 at 163 Riverview Road, Avalon Beach
- DA2022/1048 at 15 Sturdee Lane, Elvina Beach
- DA2022/1368 at 15 The Chase, Lovett Bay
- DA2022/0133 at 182 McCarrs Creek Road, Church Point
- DA2019/0534 at 271 Whale Beach Road, Whale Beach

This is only the recent approvals of inclinators. There are many more examples of existing inclinators in the area.

As confirmed in *Stockland Development Pty Ltd v Manly Council (2004) 136 LGERA 254*, consistency in decision making is a fundamental objective to those who make administrative decisions.

Character

Given the proliferation of inclinators in the immediate area and the recent approvals mentioned above, the proposed could not be considered out of character for the area or unreasonable with regard to the scenic qualities of the foreshore.

The proposed development achieves the objects in Section 1.3 of the EPA Act, specifically:

- The proposal promotes the orderly and economic use and development of land (1.3(c)).
- The development represents good design (1.3(g)).

It is noted that in *Initial Action*, the Court clarified what items a Clause 4.6 does and does not need to satisfy. Importantly, there does not need to be a "better" planning outcome:

87. *The second matter was in cl 4.6(3)(b). I find that the Commissioner applied the wrong test in considering this matter by requiring that the development, which contravened the height development standard, result in a "better environmental planning outcome for the site" relative to a development that complies with the height development standard (in [141] and [142] of the judgment). Clause 4.6 does not directly or indirectly establish this test. The requirement in cl 4.6(3)(b) is that there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard, not that the development that contravenes the development standard have a better environmental planning outcome than a development that complies with the development standard.*

There are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard.

7.8 Clause 4.6(a)(iii) – Is the proposed development in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of clause 7.8 and the objectives of the E4 Environmental Living Zone

The consent authority needs to be satisfied that the proposed development will be in the public interest if the standard is varied because it is consistent with the objectives of the standard and the objectives of the zone.

Preston CJ in *Initial Action* (Para 27) described the relevant test for this as follows:

“The matter in cl 4.6(4)(a)(ii), with which the consent authority or the Court on appeal must be satisfied, is not merely that the proposed development will be in the public interest but that it will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the development standard and the objectives for development of the zone in which the development is proposed to be carried out. It is the proposed development’s consistency with the objectives of the development standard and the objectives of the zone that make the proposed development in the public interest. If the proposed development is inconsistent with either the objectives of the development standard or the objectives of the zone or both, the consent authority, or the Court on appeal, cannot be satisfied that the development will be in the public interest for the purposes of cl 4.6(4)(a)(ii).”

As demonstrated in this request, the proposed development it is consistent with the objectives of the development standard and the objectives for development of the zone in which the development is proposed to be carried out.

Accordingly, the consent authority can be satisfied that the proposed development will be in the public interest if the standard is varied because it is consistent with the objectives of the standard and the objectives of the zone.

4.4 Secretary’s concurrence

By Planning Circular dated 5th May 2020, the Secretary of the Department of Planning & Environment advised that consent authorities can assume the concurrence to clause 4.6 request except in the circumstances set out below:

- Lot size standards for rural dwellings;
- Variations exceeding 10%; and
- Variations to non-numerical development standards.

The circular also provides that concurrence can be assumed when an LPP is the consent authority where a variation exceeds 10% or is to a non-numerical standard, because of the greater scrutiny that the LPP process and determination s are subject to, compared with decisions made under delegation by Council staff. Concurrence of the Secretary can therefore be assumed in this case.

5.0 Conclusion

Pursuant to clause 4.6(4)(a), the consent authority is satisfied that the applicant’s written request has adequately addressed the matters required to be demonstrated by subclause (3) being:

- (a) *that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, and*

- (b) *that there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard*

As such, there is no statutory or environmental planning impediment to the granting of a FBL variation in this instance.