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# **Crime Risk and Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy**

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## **Final Report**

### **in relation to the**

### **Royal Far West Development Application, 14-22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne, Manly NSW**

**10<sup>th</sup> June 2022**

**'Document Number; CP-RPT-0001'**

**In Confidence**

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**Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy  
in relation to the  
Royal Far West Development Wentworth Street and South Steyne  
Manly NSW**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

(extracted from the report)

### **ES1 Engagement, Development Overview and CPTED**

Harris Crime Prevention Services (Harris) was commissioned to provide a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) consultancy for the Royal Far West Pty Ltd (RFW) redevelopment (the redevelopment or development).

The site is located at 14-22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne, Manly. It abuts Manly Village Public School (west), and is surrounded by residential apartments, mixed-use, retail, licensed premises. It is opposite Manly Beach (and promenade) within the Manly Town Centre and a short distance to Manly Wharves.

The project sees the implementation of Stages 3 and 4 of the Concept Approval as modified (Application # MP10\_0159 MOD 1) and involves the retention and alterations to the previously constructed Stages 1 and 2 (hospital facility 'Centre for Excellence' now known as the 'CCK' building) as well as alterations and additions to Drummond House and the construction of mixed use buildings which incorporate tourist and visitor accommodation, residential apartments and retail/ commercial uses with basement parking and landscaping.

This report relates to, and will accompany, documents to be submitted to Northern Beaches Council as part of a Development Application (DA).

The consultancy was required to

- (i) assess the potential and actual crime risks to the development and
- (ii) analyse and recommend the application of CPTED principles to mitigate those risks.

### **ES2 CPTED Aim, Objectives and Principles**

The aim is for the development to become a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' for all residential, commercial, retail, contractor and visitor stakeholders.

To achieve this aim, we identify three overarching CPTED objectives.

- Objective 1 To understand the crime risk context and identify potential and actual crime risks.
- Objective 2 To affirm and/or recommend (crime) risk mitigation through CPTED solutions.
- Objective 3 To ensure (CPTED) compliance with State and/or Council planning instruments.

Our report's analyses, conclusions and recommendations are based on five acknowledged CPTED principles, adapted by Harris as:

- Principle 1 Territorial definition – clarity about spatial identity, separation, boundaries and purposes,
- Principle 2 Natural surveillance – architecture facilitating strong sightlines for ground plane, basement and/or upper-level observation and surveillance,
- Principle 3 Access control – access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why,
- Principle 4 Activity support – the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage,
- Principle 5 Target hardening – adding specific and robust architecture and technology.

CPTED-applied architecture aims to 'block' opportunistic or pre-meditated anti-social or criminal behaviour within the development footprint and its approaches. The ultimate crime prevention objective is to ensure 'welcoming-and-safe' reputational outcomes for all stakeholders.

### ES3 Assessed Potential and Actual Crime Risks Impacting the Development

The assessed crime categories, their risks and incident likelihood, should not be underestimated. This is not to alarm but to caution against mitigation complacency and to direct mitigation opportunities in the first instance towards CPTED solutions.

Anecdotal understanding, site knowledge, local police intelligence and BOCSAR data confirm common (and mostly predictable) crime categories likely to 'target' the development.

Assessing *potential* risks, levels and incident likelihood of the following categories must always be balanced against the possible '*consequences*' of breaches and *actual* criminal threats or incidents.

Even the most *minor* offence occurring within or near buildings, communal or public spaces and on surrounding streetscapes can have *major* consequences. Hence the need to address each crime category as having potentially serious consequences.

Our assessment is based on risk-to-incident likelihood for all categories: 'low' (L), 'moderate' (M), 'high' (H) and 'extreme' (E). (Appendix 2 provides an illustrative crime incident matrix, adapted from Standard ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*)

Risks and likelihood of categories (i) to (vi) occurring are assessed as:

- (i) intimidating anti-social behaviour targeting residents, visitors, commercial clients, shoppers, users of open space, contractors and tenants, (M),
- (ii) physical and/or sexual assaults against the (i) above categories, especially at night, (L),
- (iii) unauthorised access to premises and theft of property, (L),
- (iv) damage to buildings, facades, mailboxes, vehicles, infrastructure, landscaping, signs, furniture, fixtures and fittings, (M),
- (v) theft of personal or common property and/or theft from, or of, motor vehicles, (M)
- (vi) contextual or site-based drug possession, and drug dealing. (H)

There are two other potential categories. They are not likely to occur but have significant consequences if they do.

- (vii) arson or explosion(s), (L)
- (viii) injury or death to persons, damage to, or destruction of, property, from targeted and potentially, gang or terror-style attacks, (L).

## CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The RFW development documentation displays definitional design clarity. In CPTED terms, there are no ambiguously allocated spaces or confusing spatial purposes. Internal spatial separation is readily identified within basement, ground, communal and open spaces.

This broad definitional clarity provides a foundation design statement, upon which to overlay Principles 2 to 5, as part of an integrated 'welcoming-and-safe-place' whole.

Off-street vehicle and pedestrian entrances afford strong legibility, ensuring safe wayfinding to residential, commercial and retail locations. Basement parking, plant, lift lobbies, general storage, bicycle racking, waste storage and removal, are CPTED design-appropriate. Basement designs also appropriately define entry, intra-level ramping and parking bays. We recommend investigations into the most appropriate solution to deter and/or restrict unauthorised access to the basements.

DD drawings will determine the safe circulation and activation of the forecourt, courtyard, play and public social gathering, including al-fresco, spaces.

Grassed, low shrubs and (low height) tree plantings, together with creative external lighting architecture will define all ground plane spaces as welcoming and secure. Landscape design elements should minimise potential for concealment or entrapment.

Definitional clarity will enable and encourage safe 24/7 informal foot traffic circulation and activation to and through all ground plane spaces.

In our view, there are no other obvious CPTED-related definitional impediments.

The (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole', supporting the development's marketing and security objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean an overall 'safe place' reputation – one which will be sustained, in part, by the commitment of residents and tenants to on-going stakeholder (security) stewardship.

## CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The development's overall design elements promote multi-angle proximate and distant sightlines throughout the site. Ground plane surveillance opportunities are strongest.

Reviewed drawings indicate ample opportunity for natural (passive) observation and surveillance:

- (i) within the ground plane and contextual streetscapes,
- (ii) approaching, and at, pedestrian, vehicle entrances,
- (iii) from ground plane and some upper-level units or offices,
- (iv) at fire and emergency exits,
- (v) within the private-communal and open space, and
- (vi) within vehicle ramping and parking spaces,
- (vii) at and around lift lobbies, and
- (viii) approaching or at internal plant and other infrastructure rooms.

Design development architecture should affirm the above conclusions, detailing specific opportunities at, in and/or around the pedestrian traffic - forecourt, through-site street connectivity, courtyard, retail, commercial, residential and basement entry, communal cum social gathering spaces and all lift lobbies, thereby ensuring optimum day-night 'eyes and ears' awareness of usual and unusual internal and external activity.

As purposed, multi-angle, proximate-distant sightline opportunities, should significantly enhance risk mitigation, including deterring unauthorised pedestrian or vehicle access within the development footprint.

However, reliance on the effectiveness of above ground plane casual observation and/or intentional surveillance of the two streetscape frontages, including the wider beachscape, will neither add to overall security, nor facilitate deterrence.

Notwithstanding the abovementioned constraints, we conclude that current drawings maximise internal and external natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent unauthorised entry, and damage to, property and/or harm site stakeholders, visitors and contractors.

### **CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations**

Access control technology is the key to ensuring the development's 'welcoming-and-safe' place reputation. It is therefore essential that all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored and maintained to ensure performance capability.

It is also important that access restrictions be:

- (i) fully understood by all occupant stakeholders,
- (ii) complied with by stakeholder guests/visitors, tenants, clients and contractors.

The secure location of the basements must be a design development priority. It is essential that access to plant and associated infrastructure rooms, the loading area, waste storage, waste collection and general storage areas be strictly controlled.

We affirm the need for the secure location of mailboxes to prevent unlawful tampering or mail theft.

We recommend that video intercom technology be specified for all residential units pre-access identification. Commercial tenants should consider similar identification for clients. Contractors accessing sensitive and vulnerable zones should have to produce some form of identification prior to being granted access.

### **CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations**

External lighting treatments should:

- (i) support (night-time) surveillance at, and as 'spill' along, Wentworth Street and South Steyne entry points, in colour temperature 'step' with Council's roadway lighting initiatives,
- (ii) highlight pedestrian and vehicle entry points,
- (iii) provide wayfinding certainty through the forecourt and other open spaces, to strengthen whole-of-site night-time natural surveillance,
- (iv) continue sympathetic illumination, complementing spill lighting from retail tenancies and entry foyers,
- (v) provide consistent non-movement activated lighting in the basements, at high illuminance to eliminate low light or 'no light' opportunities for concealment or entrapment.

In summary, CPTED lighting aims to:

- (i) illuminate the development site footprint, perimeters and surrounds with (mostly) overhead luminaires to improve night-time wayfinding and surveillance,

(ii) avoid colour inconsistencies (clashes), and

(iii) increase minimum lux levels along lighting 'corridor' pathways, in open spaces and around each building's perimeter to highlight vulnerable ground plane areas.

We recommend recessed, targeted and where practicable, overhead LED luminaires (+ - 4000 Kelvin) for pathways, under-eaves and basements, including the loading dock, basement ramp, residential and commercial entrance lobbies. Luminaires should be sufficiently beam-angled to maximise throw, spill and (where appropriate) wash, eliminating, shadowing and dark gaps.

Bollards should not be considered for any external lighting within the development.

Landscaping should:

- (i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings,
- (ii) maximise sightline continuity,
- (iii) prevent the concealment of suspicious packages, and
- (iv) deter potential hostile vehicle access.

Signage should consider first-time and casual visitors, contractors to the site. All signs should be disability inclusive. Strategically selected signage should be back-lit to improve legibility and wayfinding. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development. DD should detail inter-disciplinary solutions.

## **CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations**

We recommend targeted IP Network (CCTV) camera surveillance of the development footprint's, vulnerable spaces, covering:

- (i) each off-street entry point,
- (ii) the basement ramp-to-roller shutter entry,
- (iii) the loading dock entry door and corridors leading to delivery points,
- (iv) lift lobbies, including at each basement level,
- (v) waste storage and collection points,
- (vi) entrance doorways to plant and utilities rooms,
- (vii) at both sides of the basement roller shutter(s) and covering internal ramping,
- (viii) the public entrances to retail and forecourt spaces.

The location of cameras should deter opportunities for concealment or entrapment and assist with identification.

Deterring and/or preventing potential out-of-control or planned hostile vehicle drivers targeting the development should be a landscaping design element as part of strengthened street fronting 'edges'

Help points should be considered, for the basements, given the 24/7 circulation and activation of those zones.

Anti-graffiti coatings are recommended for all ground floor (level) masonry finishes and to other identified vulnerable facades.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

## **Instrument Compliance    Conclusions and/or Recommendations**

We are of the view that reviewed drawings of the proposed RFW development at 14 – 22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne Manly NSW are consistent with CPTED principles and their application as required by:

- (i) legislation and/or regulations and crime prevention guidelines derived from Section 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended,
- (ii) the Development Control Plan (2013) and Community Safety Plan (2021 – 2026) of the Northern Beaches Council,
- (iii) the NSW Police Crime Prevention (Safer-By-Design) Checklist – Revision 2020.

We conclude that, subject to intentional application of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, the reviewed drawings support consent by the Northern Beaches Council, as that consent relates to fulfilling CPTED conditions.

## **OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY**

### **Application of CPTED Principles and Informing Instrument Compliance**

In our professional opinion, the Development Application for the Royal Far West Pty Ltd development at 14 – 22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne Manly NSW, has considered, or will consider, CPTED principles and their application, as assessed, affirmed or recommended in this report, prior to 90+% design development and design detail sign-off.

In compliance terms, the development's incorporation of CPTED principles adheres to the State Government's 'social impact' and 'public interest' requirements, under Section 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended, and with the Act's regulatory guidelines.

It also complies with requirements of Northern Beaches Council's Community Safety Plan 2021-2026 and Council's Development Control Plan, 2013 Amendment 11.

The development has been referenced against, and complies with, relevant sections of the NSW Police Safer-By-Design (CPTED) Guidelines (2020).

Harris Crime Prevention Services is also of the view that the proposed development should make a positive crime prevention contribution to Northern Beaches Council's broader 'community safety' objectives. The development's CPTED-applied architecture could 'showcase' future 'welcoming-and-safe-place' developments promoted and/or approved by the Council.



## **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy in relation to the Royal Far West Development Wentworth Street and South Steyne Manly NSW**

# **THE REPORT**

## **1 Engagement, Development Overview and CPTED**

### **1.1 Engagement and Development Overview**

Harris Crime Prevention Services (Harris) was commissioned to provide a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) consultancy for the Royal Far West Pty Ltd (RFW) (the redevelopment or development).

The site is located at 14-22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne, Manly. It abuts Manly Village Public School (west), and is surrounded by residential apartments, mixed-use, retail, licensed premises. It is opposite Manly Beach (and promenade) within the Manly Town Centre and a short distance to Manly Wharves.

The project sees the implementation of Stages 3 and 4 of the Concept Approval as modified (Application # MP10\_0159 MOD 1) and involves the retention and alterations to the previously constructed Stages 1 and 2 (hospital facility 'Centre for Excellence' now known as the 'CCK' building) as well as alterations and additions to Drummond House and the construction of mixed use buildings which incorporate tourist and visitor accommodation, residential apartments and retail/ commercial uses with basement parking and landscaping.

The report relates to, and will accompany, documents to be submitted to Northern Beaches Council as part of a Development Application (DA). Our assessment, conclusions and recommendations have been informed, in part, by referenced architectural drawings issued by Murcutt Candalepas (Issue P11 – P15, January 2022, Issue P31, March 2022 and Issue 1 April 2022).

The consultancy was required to:

- (i) assess the potential and actual crime risks to the development and
- (ii) analyse and recommend the application of CPTED principles to mitigate those risks.

The DA proposal includes:

- (i) an 8-storey mixed-use building ('Building C') comprising 42 residential apartments, plus ground level multi-purpose spaces, plus 2 commercial levels,
- (ii) a 5-storey residential apartment block ('Building D') comprising 16 residential apartments surmounting a landscaped open ground level,
- (iii) minor alterations and additions to the existing Centre for Country Kids ('CCK – Building A') and Drummond House ('Building B'),
- (iv) a two-level basement for vehicle parking, services and storage; an extension of the existing car park, and
- (v) public and communal open space.

## 1.2 CPTED Consultancy Aim and Objectives

The aim is for the development to become a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' for all residential, commercial, retail, contractor and visitor stakeholders.

To achieve this aim, we identify three overarching CPTED objectives.

- Objective 1 To understand the crime risk context and identify potential and actual crime risks.
- Objective 2 To affirm and/or recommend (crime) risk mitigation through CPTED solutions.
- Objective 3 To ensure (CPTED) compliance with State and/or Council planning instruments.

We have reviewed CPTED-relevant drawings and have consulted with the client to ensure the aim and objectives have been met, or will be met, during design development.

Designing-out crime through the application of CPTED principles is an acknowledged crime prevention platform. Harris defines CPTED as '*applying aspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals (projects) as an intentional environmental crime prevention strategy*'.

## 1.3 CPTED Principles

Our report's analyses, conclusions and recommendations are based on five acknowledge CPTED principles, adapted by Harris as:

- Principle 1 Territorial definition – clarity about spatial identify, separation, boundaries and purposes,
- Principle 2 Natural surveillance – architecture facilitating strong sightlines for ground plane, basement and/or upper-level observation and surveillance,
- Principle 3 Access control – access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why,
- Principle 4 Activity support – the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage,
- Principle 5 Target hardening – adding specific and robust architecture and technology.

CPTED-applied architecture aims to 'block' opportunistic or pre-meditated anti-social or criminal behaviour within the development footprint and its approaches. The ultimate crime prevention objective is to ensure 'welcoming-and-safe' reputational outcomes for all stakeholders.

## 1.4 The Harris Approach

The Harris approach to crime prevention design and management incorporates aspects of architecture, engineering and technology which underpins a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' objective. This approach seamlessly welcomes, defines, guides, directs, encourages, regulates activity, appropriate functional objectives. Safe place design outcomes seek to override opportunistic and deliberate anti-social and criminal behaviour.

Harris defines 'welcoming and safe place' as: '*built form and public space environments where crime prevention has been a consideration of concept, master-planning, design development and construction processes and where safe place outcomes enhance a community's overall reputation*'.

# 2 Report Structure, Scope, Stakeholders and Informing Instruments

## 2.1 Report Structure

The report is structured as:

- Section 1 engagement, development overview, CPTED aim and objectives,
- Section 2 report structure, scope, outcomes, informing legislation/Standards,
- Section 3 local crime and crime risk intelligence and data,
- Section 4 assessed crime risks to the development,

Section 5	CPTED-applied principles for the development's risk mitigation outcomes,
Section 6	compliance with legislation, regulation, planning and/or policy instruments,
Section 7	the link between, and value of, a combined CPTED and CPTM strategy, creating and maintaining 'welcoming-and-safe-place' as the interdependent objective,
Section 8	references, and,
Appendices	supporting Appendices, 1 – 3.

## 2.2 Consultancy Scope and Outcomes

The scope has addressed crime risk and crime prevention (CPTED) solutions to assist the design team in creating a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' for children their families, staff, medical practitioners, commercial and retail tenants, residents, contractors and the visiting public. We have:

- (i) undertaken day and night site visits and neighbourhood to better understand the crime risks and interface between the (current) CCK – Building 'A' and other elements of the development proposal,
- (ii) clarified/met with the architect/developer regarding the CPTED elements of the overall design that may have been amended since the Section 75 (MP10\_1059) Harris report – October 2021,
- (iii) referenced current contextual anti-social and criminal behaviour data likely to impact on the project,
- (iv) reviewed current discipline drawings to identify CPTED applications regarding safe day-night internal and external circulation-activation and interconnectivity between the architectural elements including the entry forecourt, open spaces, residential, retail and commercial access,
- (v) affirmed and/or recommended design measures based on CPTED principles, including spatial definition, natural and technical (CCTV) surveillance, access control, (external) lighting, landscaping, signage and special 'target hardening' measures,
- (vi) noted the impact of weather, climate variations and day/night comparisons on 'safe place' form and function,
- (vii) considered CPTED solutions in compliance with relevant legislative, policy and/or planning instruments, and
- (viii) provided a CPTED report incorporating the Scope elements.

Harris believes that the entire development should 'model' a welcoming-and-safe-place reputation. This would:

- (i) showcase CPTED best practice solutions,
- (ii) enhance the architectural integrity and objectives of the development,
- (iii) holistically protect all assets – people, property, systems and infrastructure,
- (iv) reinforce the site's implementation of site-wide CPTED design and management solutions,
- (v) meet the expectations of secondary stakeholders, e.g. insurers, auditors,
- (vi) comply with the requirements of Section 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act 1979, as amended, with the security (crime prevention) requirements of Northern Beaches Council and of NSW Police.

## 2.3 Key Stakeholders

Key stakeholder groups are:

- (i) Murcutt Candalepas,
- (ii) Royal Far West,
- (iii) Northern Beaches Council,
- (iv) Residents, visitors, contractors, retail and commercial tenants,
- (v) 'Users' of open space,
- (vi) NSW Police,
- (vii) adjacent neighbours and broader Manly community.

While each stakeholder will have different community safety expectations, their broad expectations are similar in that personal and property safety is a 'given' of the designing-out-crime objectives.

## 2.4 Informing Instruments and Information

Our analyses, conclusions and recommendations are informed and/or underpinned by:

- (i) the NSW EPA Act,
- (ii) Northern Beaches Council's Manly Development Control Plan and Community Safety Plan,
- (iii) crime risk information from Northern Beaches Police Area Command - Manly Police Station,
- (iv) data from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR).

The development's compliance with, or reference to, these instruments is covered in **Section 6**.

Our analysis and report is also underpinned by two International Standards, ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*, which provides a helpful framework to identify and manage any organisational risks, include crime risks, and ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*, which provides an acknowledged CPTED framework.

## 2.5 Supporting Documents

The report has three (supporting) appendices:

- Appendix 1 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) - reported crime statistics for Manly over five years, October 2016 to September 2021.
- Appendix 2 The Risk Management Standard ISO31000:2018 (the Standard), its relevance to the development.
- Appendix 3 The Influence of CPTED in Re-designing Public Spaces for Safe and 'Liveable' Activation.

## 2.6 Notes and Disclaimer

**Note 1** Harris' consultancy services are provided independently; i.e. we are not affiliated with, nor receive benefits from, any organisation that supplies security hardware, installs security systems, monitors alarm systems or provides guarding/patrol services. This independence is critical to the way we approach security solution options and recommendations.

**Note 2** The scope excluded the development/provision of a technical security brief, security systems design and specifications or lighting brief and specifications.

**Note 3** The commentary, assessment, conclusions and recommendations outlined in the report are based on information provided to Harris Crime Prevention Services at the time of this assignment.

**Disclaimer:** While our research and experience suggest CPTED can be adopted to reduce opportunities for crime, it is not possible to guarantee that actual crime will be reduced or eliminated if these suggestions and/or recommendations are implemented.

# 3 Local Crime Risk Context, Police Intelligence and Crime Data

## 3.1 The Crime Risk Context

The RFW redevelopment is a multi-faceted public space, retail, residential and commercial precinct. The whole-of-site footprint has an operational history that dates back nearly a century.

The development footprint, and in fact the whole of Manly's Town Centre, is a high-profile tourist destination for Sydney, NSW, national and international visitors. The tourist demographic ranges across the young-to- older age groups. While the summer months are tourist 'high season', winter tourism is also popular.

The Town Centre and its immediate surrounds is a broad stakeholder mix – residential houses and apartments, minor and major retail, commercial offices, licenced premises, schools, churches, sporting grounds and surfing-related premises. The gradual Town Centre changes over the decades have significantly increased day-night pedestrian and vehicle circulation and activation.

One of many iconic features of Manly over the decades has been the RFW campus. We are conscious of RFW's unique 98-year history of advocating for country children and families, providing... *"a unique, integrated health, education and disability service model that is focused on the whole child, their family and community, and we support children and families with a broad range of developmental and behavioural concerns."* (2016-2020 RFW Strategic Plan).

The site-wide development should therefore ensure legacy continuity; hence this Statement's emphasis on creating and sustaining safe-space within and around each of the buildings and public (open) space as an integral part of the legacy.

The significant RFW 'scene' differences are:

- (i) opening the site to an eclectic stakeholder mix, including part public access,
- (ii) day-night multi-user circulation and activation,
- (iii) new residential, commercial and retail occupant-stakeholders.

Under this proposal, the RFW community changes from a (largely contained) single use operation to a multi-faceted operation. Changes have the potential to introduce new crime (and anti-social) risks, which if not identified and mitigated could negatively impact on the RFW's positive reputational legacy.

### 3.2 Local Police (Crime Risk) Intelligence

We have contacted (8<sup>th</sup> February 2022) the Crime Prevention Officer (CPO) at Manly Police Station who advised that the anti-social behaviour and criminal behaviour around the development's context comprises a familiar list of occurrences and offences. These include alcohol-influenced noise, disruptive activity and drug-related offences within the beachfront and along the Esplanade, mainly on weekends and at night.

This activity can often escalate to property and person-targeted offences. Graffiti and other property façade damage is constantly coming to the attention of police and the Manly business community.

The CPO does not see any behaviour or offences predominating within the immediate development site. The crime risks are 'spread' along the beachfront and within the CBD.

### 3.3 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) Data

BOCSAR data is published to indicate trends in various offence categories over a 5 year (year-on-year) period. Appendix 1 details the latest data. In summary the following trends have occurred:

- (i) Non-domestic assaults, for example, assaults occurring in public spaces, on public transport or in commercial, industrial, recreational and retail settings, are down by 10.3%,
- (ii) Break and enter dwelling offences are down by 8.2%,
- (iii) Stealing from retail stores, down 18.7%,
- (iv) Stealing from dwellings, down 9.5%,
- (v) Liquor offences, down by 9.4%,
- (vi) Disorderly and offensive conduct, down by 24.1% and
- (vii) Malicious damage to property, down 7.7%.

Unfortunately, the offence of intimidation, stalking and harassment is up by 21.2%.

While drug offences (over the 5 years) are listed as 'stable', year-on-year raw figures remain relatively high, between the high 400s and the mid 600s.

Arguably, many of the 'downward' trends over the last 2 years could have been impacted by Covid lockdowns and other restrictions. No matter the reasons, the downward trends are welcome.

## 4 Assessed Potential and Actual Crime Risks Impacting the Development

While many of the BOCSAR categories and offences coming under police investigation, occur in public spaces, there are still risks to public and private property, to and around the RFW development.

Predicting when, where, what, how and why risks can become threats and incidents targeting the development footprint, may be influenced by factors such as:

- (i) the surrounding context's potential to 'attract' opportunities for anti-social or criminal behaviour,
- (ii) time of day or night and weather conditions for such opportunities,
- (iii) the emotional 'state' and motive of a person intending to commit an offence,
- (iv) the intended targets – people and/or property, and
- (v) how easy or difficult it is to unlawfully gain access to targets.

The current crime risks require this development's architecture to (a) secure whole-of-site 'safe place' and (b) contribute to contextual crime risk mitigation as part of broader community and Council crime prevention initiatives.

### 4.1 The Harris-Assessed Contextual Crime Risk Summary

The assessed crime categories, their risks and incident likelihood, should not be underestimated. This is not to alarm but to caution against mitigation complacency and to direct mitigation opportunities in the first instance towards CPTED solutions.

Anecdotal understanding, site knowledge, local police intelligence and BOCSAR data confirm common (and mostly predictable) crime categories likely to 'target' the development.

Assessing *potential* risks, levels and incident likelihood of the following categories must always be balanced against the possible '*consequences*' of breaches and *actual* criminal threats or incidents.

Even the most *minor* offence occurring within or near buildings, communal or public spaces and on surrounding streetscapes can have *major* consequences. Hence the need to address each crime category as having potentially serious consequences.

Our assessment is based on risk-to-incident likelihood for all categories: 'low' (L), 'moderate' (M), 'high' (H) and 'extreme' (E). (Appendix 2 provides an illustrative crime incident matrix, adapted from Standard ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*)

Risks and likelihood of categories (i) to (vi) occurring are assessed as

- (i) intimidating anti-social behaviour targeting residents, visitors, commercial clients, shoppers, users of open space, contractors and tenants, (M),
- (ii) physical and/or sexual assaults against the (i) above categories, especially at night, (L),
- (iii) unauthorised access to premises and theft of property, (L),
- (iv) damage to buildings, facades, mailboxes, vehicles, infrastructure, landscaping, signs, furniture, fixtures and fittings, (M),
- (v) theft of personal or common property and/or theft from, or of, motor vehicles, (M)
- (vi) contextual or premises-based drug possession, and drug dealing. (H)



There are two other potential categories. They are not likely to occur but have significant consequences if they do.

- (vii) arson or explosion(s), (L)
- (viii) injury or death to persons, damage to, or destruction of, property, from targeted and potentially, gang or terror-style attacks, (L).



## 5 CPTED Applications to Ensure 'Welcoming and Safe Place' Outcomes

### 5.1 CPTED Principle 1

**Territorial Definition: clarity about spatial identity, separation, boundaries and purposes**

#### General Explanation

Defining territorial boundaries, spatial separation and purposes are the elements of this first CPTED principle. The aim is to maximise built form and public domain 'knowledge certainty' for all who have day-night access to a site.

Stakeholder, occupant, visitor or contractor knowledge (identification) of territorial sub-spaces increases destination and circulation confidence; (for example, design of mixed-use spaces including, building entrances, public, communal, sporting, retail, commercial, residential, industrial, social gathering, wayfinding and vehicle access spaces).

When spaces become clearly defined collective 'places', form and function are easily identified. This removes confusion of purpose, enhances safe circulation and maximises alertness to any surrounding risks or threats.

#### 5.1.1 Application – Overall Footprint Definition

From a CPTED perspective, the 'siting' of each building on the footprint is the critical foundation to ensure site-wide 'knowledge certainty', for regular users/occupiers and for first time 'visitors', defined in the broadest terms. It is our view that Buildings B, C and D fulfil that design requirement.

We assess that the overall built form, public and communal spaces, through-site and intra-site link definitions have footprint certainty and safe wayfinding attractiveness.

The Murcutt Candalepas Drawings, Revision1 indicate:

- (i) street-fronting and rear site perimeter (boundary) clarity,
- (ii) clearly identified built form locations, layout and spatial separation ensuring contextual 'knowledge',

- (iii) certainty of intra-site wayfinding, circulation and activation, especially for what will become highly trafficked purposes,
- (iv) access certainty to and from each building, interconnecting pathways to ground level retail, commercial and residential entry points, including the Wentworth Street entry to both basements,
- (v) proposed public through-site access,
- (vi) inviting community social gathering spaces between and around buildings, including forecourt and courtyard zones,
- (vii) purposed internal road (and lane) providing intra-site legibility.

In our opinion, the interconnected (integrated) nature of the development ensures whole-of-site clarity of purpose through well-defined spatial separation and overall legibility. CPTED 'looks for' this clarity.

### 5.1.2 Application – Perimeters

Further to (i) above, the perimeters are clearly defined either as street frontages, or as fenced boundaries to neighbouring properties. Streetscape screening through appropriate landscaping and fencing will comply with Council's intention to define and welcome users of the site, emphasising a normal neighbourly presence.

It is important that all fencing:

- (i) clearly define perimeters and neighbouring properties,
- (ii) maximise on-site and perimeter natural and technical surveillance,
- (iii) respect adjacent property privacy, and
- (iv) deter and/or prevent unauthorised access.

Our report's **Section 4.1** lists our assessment of crime risk types and levels. The Police comments on the development's context, confirm that assessment. We therefore affirm and/or recommend the following:

- (i) ensuring existing or proposed solid metal fencing is specified to secure rear-of-site boundaries,
- (ii) consideration of solid decorative, eg sandstone, barriers along the Wentworth Street and South Steyne frontages as part of streetscape landscaping to deter and/or prevent hostile vehicle penetration of the site. (Although an unlikely crime risk, it has become more likely in recent years – refer **4.1**, **5.4.2** and **5.5.4**).

### 5.1.3 Application – Spatial Separation and Purposes

There is unambiguous definitional certainty with the positioning of Buildings C and D and their relationship to Building B. The proposed off-street site entrances present safe-to-site and through-site wayfinding. There are no apparent 'hidden' spaces in the reviewed drawings, likely to conceal or entrap, within the site.

Clear sightlines are evident between buildings, pathways and the pedestrian entrances, guiding the public, residents' visitors, contractors or commercial clients to designated retail options or foyers.

### 5.1.4 Application – Ground Plane Pedestrian Circulation and Activation

There is intentional purpose and spatial separation of 'closed' and open ground plane spaces. The forecourt and outdoor public gathering around cafe/restaurant and communal spaces are appropriately and clearly defined in concept and provide wayfinding clarity.

The intended invitational mix of residents, tenants, clients, retail shoppers and 'exploring' visitors poses a security challenge. Defining circulation and activation wayfinding – the knowledge certainty objective – 'authorises' movement throughout the ground plane.

We recommend a review of the solid wall designs around the residential and retail entry points. Glazing elements should be considered to improve security by (a) preventing concealment and (b) improving surveillance.



Drawings demonstrate clarity of street-to-site access, residential and commercial entry foyers, location of Drummond House courtyard spaces and play areas, general forecourt, café and restaurant locations and the various circulation-activation patterns resulting from these 'options'.

The revised Drummond House entry and vestibule design provides welcoming and safe clarity.

Landscaping design will play an important part in 'demonstrating' the 'welcoming-and-safe-place' objective for these spaces – refer **5.4.2**.

### **5.1.5 Application – Ground Plane Residential, Commercial and Retail Entrances**

Drawings clearly separate all points of off-street ground plane and basement entrances and lift lobbies. Fire-exit stairwells will be located as per coded regulations.

The ground plane commercial lobby is shared with the Wentworth Street residential entry to Building C and is appropriately only accessible by either stakeholder or invited clients and visitors. All other residential entries and lobbies follow CPTED definitional design recommendations.

### **5.1.6 Application – Residential Apartments**

Given the ground plane and basement security required for upper level residential and commercial access, we have no issue with residential unit designs in terms of layout. The commercial suites are under design review so no CPTED layout comment is possible at this stage.

We affirm the retail façade redesign to remove potential concealment or entrapment at the southern (South Steyne) residential lobby.

### **5.1.7 Application – Basement Vehicle Entry and Parking**

Drawings appropriately define and restrict vehicle access and circulation, accentuating the safe and legible circulation/activation of site stakeholders for all three buildings. On-site location of the shared basement vehicle entry is practical.

We recommend that the entry ramp be configured for 'split' entry and exit roller door operation. This better controls vehicle movement and limits attempted unauthorised vehicle entry. If not feasible, rapid roller doors to be installed at entry and exit points in front of the single roller shutter. This and other options will require further investigation. The ultimate objective is to deter and/or restrict unauthorised access to the basements.

We support the addition of internal roller shutters offering a secure barrier between commercial and residential uses.

We understand that there will be a video intercom system to authorise visitor and contractor access.

The shared basements between Buildings B, C and D allows for all specific parking designation and interconnectivity. Drawings indicate Wentworth Street entry ramping, internal driveways, parking bay layouts, lift foyers and general circulation. Both basements provide for appropriately located bicycle racks and commercial/residential visitor parking in Basement 1.

### **5.1.8 Application – Basement Lift Lobbies**

Commercial, residential and 'back-of-house' lobbies are appropriately located and defined, including the additional residential goods lift which will service the two retail storerooms in each basement. We note that all lobbies are accessible via a secured doorway. We recommend that lobby wall surrounds be glazed, where practical, to promote natural surveillance.

### 5.1.9 Application – General Storage, Waste Storage and Collection

Bulky and general waste is to be stored in separately designated spaces within Basement 1 with a centrally located (combined) loading and collection zone. The secured residential waste storage zone is appropriately located adjacent to general storage and plant rooms.

Procedures for waste storage and collection must be strictly followed by residential, commercial and contract 'stakeholders' to ensure there is no unauthorised access to these zones.

These locations should be protected by fire detection and suppression systems.

### 5.1.10 Application – Utilities Infrastructure and Other Plant

Protecting plant and infrastructure is critical. Defining and securing each element forms the basis for a collective approach as to who has access to what and why. If appropriate, the sub-station kiosk should be Palisade-style fenced and gated to deter graffiti, other potential damage and concealment, particularly due to its close proximity to main entries.

Ground plane booster pumps and hydrants should be façade-recessed, or caged, (pedestal valves should have approved security covers installed) again to deter tampering of valves and pipes. Comms and other plant will be ground-plane secured.

We note the opportunity in the basements to secure plant including, sprinkler and hydrant pumps, HW plant, grease arrestor etc.

#### CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The RFW development documentation displays definitional design clarity. In CPTED terms, there are no ambiguously allocated spaces or confusing spatial purposes. Internal spatial separation is readily identified within basement, ground, communal and open spaces.

This broad definitional clarity provides a foundation design statement, upon which to overlay Principles 2 to 5, as part of an integrated 'welcoming-and-safe-place' whole.

Off-street vehicle and pedestrian entrances afford strong legibility, ensuring safe wayfinding to residential, commercial and retail locations. Basement parking, plant, lift lobbies, general storage, bicycle racking, waste storage and removal, are CPTED design-appropriate. Basement designs also appropriately define entry, intra-level ramping and parking bays. We recommend investigations into the most appropriate solution to deter and/or restrict unauthorised access to the basements.

DD drawings will determine the safe circulation and activation of the forecourt, courtyard, play and public social gathering, including al-fresco, spaces.

Grassed, low shrubs and (low height) tree plantings, together with creative external lighting architecture will define all ground plane spaces as welcoming and secure. Landscape design elements should minimise potential for concealment or entrapment.

Definitional clarity will enable and encourage safe 24/7 informal foot traffic circulation and activation to and through all ground plane spaces.

In our view, there are no other obvious CPTED-related definitional impediments.

The (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole', supporting the development's marketing and security objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean an overall 'safe place' reputation – one which will be sustained, in part, by the commitment of residents and tenants to on-going stakeholder (security) stewardship.

## 5.2 CPTED Principle 2

### Natural Surveillance: architecture facilitating informal observation

#### General Explanation

The principle of natural (aka informal or casual) surveillance encourages (i) the observation of built form and public domain spaces and purposes by user/stakeholders and (ii) the observation and notation within or around spaces of usual or unusual activity and behaviour, potentially (or actually) leading to anti-social or criminal threats and incidents.

Natural surveillance is purposeful observation. Maximum surveillance impact requires sightline certainty, facilitated by clear proximate-distant and longitudinal-latitude fields. The aim is to know who or what is within a surveillance field and to observe specific unlawful action or intent.

Legible and permeable architecture should ordinarily promote natural surveillance in and around clear reference fields. CPTED surveillance-focused architecture adds a crime prevention 'layer' to legible and permeable circulation and activation creativity.

#### 5.2.1 Application – On-site and On-Street (Ground Plane) Surveillance

Sharp, interconnected ground plane sightlines are the key to maximising effective natural surveillance towards, and away from site approaches and entrances to the three buildings and approaches to the Wentworth Street basement ramp. Interrupted or detached sightlines cause contextual disengagement, reducing the impact of surveillance opportunities.

This development 'solves' the natural surveillance concerns. The footprint, built form, communal and public spaces provide a collective ground plane natural surveillance 'positive'. This is due to:

- (i) the multi-purpose nature of ground plane activation,
- (ii) the encouragement of stakeholder and public access 'mix',
- (iii) intended day-night pedestrian traffic to and through the site,
- (iv) proximity of associated to beach and street activation.

Given the definitional certainty of the site, observation (surveillance) along and at intersecting circulation-activation axes will be maximised. Proximate sightlines are therefore strong, enhancing opportunities to note, record and/or report suspicious anti-social or crime-related behaviour. Context, purpose and opportunity are critical elements in maximising this development's natural surveillance.

Distant sightlines to the site will come from the contextual foot and vehicle traffic. There are no obvious recesses or blind corners which might lead to concealment or entrapment.

In our experience therefore, and from scholarly research, legible and permeable ground plane surveillance has advantages:

- (i) Sightlines are at eye level facilitating proximate and distant surveillance.
- (ii) The hearing range is closer meaning incidents are more likely to be sight-sound identified, even when there are contextual distractions.
- (iii) There is a sense of context – the observer and/or hearer is usually within or near the same space and is 'drawn' to any unusual or disturbing behaviour.
- (iv) Contextual eyes-and-ears surveillance may cause a 'no response' and/or withdrawal from involvement, while retaining memory of what was seen or heard.
- (v) There are many examples of individuals or groups physically responding to, and/or reporting on-street or in premises threats or incidents.
- (vi) Night-time on-street person and property surveillance is still effective due to retaining same-plane visual and aural (audible) cues.

Definition + strong sightlines at and around all RFW ground plane spaces will facilitate the day-night 'eyes and ears' awareness by observing the usual and unusual.

Principle 1 affirmed the development's definitional design to promote safe casual and purposeful pedestrian circulation around each building, site 'edges', approach points and basement parking approach.

### 5.2.2 Application – Basement Services and Parking Surveillance

Vehicles entering the basements can easily be observed on approach and entry. Within both basements, internal ramping, parking bays, general and waste storage, plant rooms and lift lobbies are observable from localised zones.

### 5.2.3 Application – Upper-Level Surveillance

The 'spread' of Buildings B, C and D permit varying opportunities of upper-level surveillance. Building B's guests can observe (and hear) activity in the courtyard-play area, albeit they are secure spaces. Buildings C and D encourage office and residential balcony and 'window' surveillance to forecourt, other inter-social gathering spaces, building entrances and street-level (contextual) activation. Surveillance above Levels 3 or 4 provide diminishing surveillance returns.

**Note:** Above street-level surveillance in similar urban settings has seen diminishing returns over recent decades. Among the reasons are:

- (i) Upper-level residential, commercial or retail owner-occupiers are reluctant to 'become involved', even to report, any unusual on-street sights or sounds, which they typically consider as risking their personal safety or security.
- (ii) Persons on upper-level balconies, terraces or inside occupied space can only observe and hear at angled visual and aural fields, which may be further impacted by landscaping, vehicle flow or other activation in peak times.
- (iii) Upper-level surveillance is less likely at night where angled vision towards the street is poor,
- (iv) Most owner-occupiers of urban apartments locate internally after dark.
- (v) Upper level surveillance separates the observer from the street – context detachment.
- (vi) Separateness or detachment fosters disengagement – the concern (for example excessive and/or intimidating noise, or incident becomes someone else's problem).

In natural surveillance terms, this lack of involvement and decline in engagement has been progressive with apartment living. Privacy and isolation have become sought-after features of purchase and/or rental occupancy. The sense of neighbourhood stewardship or 'guardianship' coined by Danielle Reynald (2010) is being, or has been, lost in favour of a sense of withdrawal and retreat into non-involvement.

Overall, we affirm that the RFW's built form, communal and public access/space design will be a significant contributor to site and contextual natural surveillance.

## CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The development's overall design elements promote multi-angle proximate and distant sightlines throughout the site. Ground plane surveillance opportunities are strongest.

Reviewed drawings indicate ample opportunity for natural (passive) observation and surveillance:

- (i) within the ground plane and contextual streetscapes,
- (ii) approaching, and at, pedestrian, vehicle entrances,
- (iii) from ground plane and some upper-level units or offices,
- (iv) at fire and emergency exits,
- (v) within the private-communal and open space, and,
- (vi) within vehicle ramping and parking spaces,
- (vii) at and around lift lobbies, and
- (viii) approaching or at internal plant and other infrastructure rooms.

Design development architecture should affirm the above conclusions, detailing specific opportunities at, in and/or around the pedestrian traffic - forecourt, through-site street connectivity, courtyard, retail,

commercial, residential and basement entry, communal cum social gathering spaces and all lift lobbies, thereby ensuring optimum day-night 'eyes and ears' awareness of usual and unusual internal and external activity.

As purposed, multi-angle, proximate-distant sightline opportunities, should significantly enhance risk mitigation, including deterring unauthorised pedestrian or vehicle access within the development footprint.

However, reliance on the effectiveness of above ground plane casual observation and/or intentional surveillance of the two streetscape frontages, including the wider beachscape, will neither add to overall security, nor facilitate deterrence.

Notwithstanding the abovementioned constraints, we conclude that current drawings maximise internal and external natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent unauthorised entry, and damage to, property and/or harm site stakeholders, visitors and contractors.

### 5.3 CPTED Principle 3 Access Control: who goes where, when and why

#### General Explanation

Access control is a consequential extension of defining territory (Principle 1) and natural surveillance (Principle 2). Open and/or restricted access must be: (a) readily identified through the appropriate built form (approach) architecture, (b) supported by physical and electronic access control systems (pacs) and (c) able to prevent and/or identify unauthorised access.

#### 5.3.1 Application – Access to The Site

There is deliberate invitational pedestrian access to promote day-night ground plane activation. Casual visitors, resident and commercial tenant exploration of the forecourt, cafés and other minor retail, form part of the brief. Built form and open space design define the activation objectives (refer Principle 1). There are no barriers to this accessibility.

#### 5.3.2 Application – Ground Plane, Basement and Upper-Level Building Access

Buildings B, C and D have secured independent access for residents, their (invited) visitors, for commercial tenants and their clients, for other tenancies and for contractors including emergency response vehicles. DD will detail how each entrance will be secured and monitored.

#### 5.3.3 Application – Storage, Plant, Waste and Utilities Infrastructure

Plant and comms rooms located at ground plane, basement or upper-level locations should indicate that these are controlled and access limited zones, secured and accessible by 'contractor only'.

We see the location of boosters as 'vulnerable' on-street or other ground plane targets. We reinforce the security benefits of enclosing ground plane meters, hydrants and boosters and pedestals, emphasising the need to deter the possibility of explosive device 'plants' and hostile vehicle targeting. Externally caged infrastructure should be free from any obscuring landscaping.

We note that waste storage and collection points are internally located and secured, accessed only by service vehicle contractors.

#### 5.3.4 Fire Stair Access

It is essential that all fire stairs remain for egress purposes only. All fire stairs should be electronically alarmed to prevent and/or advise doors being accidentally or intentionally left ajar.

We note that a fire stair associated with Building D will also be used for access by 'authorised' users, either by programmed fobs or video intercom.

All fire stair exit doors should be under camera surveillance and be appropriately lit.

#### 5.3.5 Application – Access to Mailboxes

DD should specify the secure internal location of cluster and stand-alone mailboxes. Mail theft is becoming an increasing concern as it can lead to identity theft.

### CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Access control technology is the key to ensuring the development's 'welcoming-and-safe' place reputation. It is therefore essential that all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored and maintained to ensure performance capability.

It is also important that access restrictions be:

- (i) fully understood by all occupant stakeholders,
- (ii) complied with by stakeholder guests/visitors, tenants, clients and contractors.

The secure location of the basements must be a design development priority. It is essential that access to plant and associated infrastructure rooms, the loading area, waste storage, waste collection and general storage areas be strictly controlled.

We affirm the need for the secure location of mailboxes to prevent unlawful tampering or mail theft.

We recommend that video intercom technology be specified for all residential units as pre-access identification. Commercial tenants should consider similar identification for clients. Contractors accessing sensitive and vulnerable zones should have to produce some form of identification prior to being granted access.

### 5.4 CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support: influences of (mainly external) lighting, landscaping and signage

#### General Explanation

Activity support applies (external) lighting, landscaping and signage architecture to a footprint's form and function design, 'supporting' definitional clarity, passive and technical surveillance and access control (Principles 1 to 3).

*External (and where appropriate Internal) Lighting* should reflect 'purpose' consistency: wayfinding, destination, social gathering and decorative-aesthetic. Each requires differing luminarie styles, lighting types, spread, throw, spill, wash and lux levels, to accord with lighting Standards and architectural briefs.

CPTED lighting applications can (should) often exceed those Standards and briefs so as to highlight spaces and circulation - activation 'corridors'.



Differential lighting should avoid cross-over colour (temperature) clashes to enhance surveillance identification of property and people. All external lighting should optimise sightline legibility, to facilitate proximate-distant wayfinding and destination confidence.

*Landscaping* should combine aesthetics and purpose with an intent to prevent concealment or entrapment.

*Signage* supports wayfinding and destination certainty, access limiting (controlling), warning and emergency awareness. It should have day-night visual impact

#### 5.4.1 Application – Entrance, Car Park, Lobby and Communal Space Lighting

Lighting is a critical 'support' for the development's 'welcoming-and-safe-place' vision; an integral part of the mixed-use day-night activation brief. From a CPTED perspective it is essential to present consistent lighting characteristics at all ground plane entrances, at the forecourt and retail spaces.

Luminaire and colour choices should maximise night-time surveillance. Shadowing or lighting clashes may compromise surveillance and safe way-finding effectiveness.

LED lighting is assumed and we suggest (+ -) 4000 Kelvin, as the most appropriate colour temperature to maximise proximate and distant observation (surveillance) and, where necessary, identification. The white-natural light spectrum around 4000 Kelvin has advantages over blue, orange or yellow colour output. Yellow, orange and blue renditions distort natural colour profiles and features. White light installations strengthen contrasting colours and identify individual (personal) features more distinctly.

There are three main external spaces to consider – entrances, lobbies, basement and communal or forecourt space lighting.

- (i) Pedestrian and vehicle entry lighting should provide approach and wayfinding illuminance which eliminates shadowing or gaps in the focus, throw and spill aims. Wentworth and South Steyne street lighting will share, and hopefully complement, on-street, forecourt and under-croft overhead (down) lighting.
- (ii) Lux levels should exceed the Standard in order to highlight ground plane residential and commercial approaches and entrances. We do not recommend wall lighting due to probable glare and shadowing potential.
- (iii) The basement entrance, internal ramping, all parking zones, lobbies and all secure basement spaces require similar lighting consistencies. Again, the CPTED objective is to eliminate dark or unlit gaps for what are the most vulnerable basement zones. LED (4000K) is most appropriate as ceiling installations, ensuring the 'reach' into parking corners, for example, bicycle spaces, disabled bays and internal ramps.

Additional lux levels should be considered either side of the recommended 'split' roller shutters. The service vehicle bay requires the same high lux levels to increase legibility and surveillance of the loading and waste collection spaces.

We do not recommend movement-activated LED panel installations (or similar) as the intermittent throw and spill causes confusion and will leave un-activated spaces in the dark.

- (iv) Drawings confirm the security of lift lobbies. We still recommend high lux levels for each to enhance wayfinding confidence at all basement lobbies.

We acknowledge the need for lighting flexibility to enable architectural variations in lighting styles and objectives, commensurate with cultural and artistic requirements.

From a CPTED perspective, there is a need to balance lighting flexibility with safety/security, through consistent lux levels and colour temperature installations, facilitating 'corridor' wayfinding and destination certainty.

**Note:** We are of the view that the use of bollard, wall-mounted and other forms of up lighting or low height spherical luminaires throughout all ground plane open spaces should be avoided, both for wayfinding and lighting pocket gathering areas. They create glare and tend to interrupt sightline or way-finding certainty. Bollards are also prone to damage and can often be ‘buried’ by mid height plantings, should these be specified. We recommend other forms of decorative lighting be considered.

#### 5.4.2 Application – Landscaping

Landscaping (and lighting) will define the attractiveness and safety of the ground plane footprint. We have reviewed landscape drawings which indicate no obvious concealment or entrapment concerns.

It is essential that no trees or shrubs obstruct, or be located near, the building entrances. Landscaping around basement or pedestrian entrances can conceal or entrap. We understand that plantings will not obscure non-recessed booster or hydrant enclosures.

Unfortunately, there are more extreme risks and consequences to the development. These relate to (a) the dealing of drugs and (b) the intention to cause maximum harm or property damage, especially in crowded spaces.

(a) Should above ground boxed or ‘contained’ plantings be considered, for example, in or around the forecourt and related gathering spaces, wire mesh can be placed at minimal depths below mulch, as a deterrent of potential criminality. This can prevent secreting drugs, other suspicious packages or potentially explosive devices in those spaces,

(b) This relates to the possibility of uncontrolled and/or intention hostile vehicle penetration at either street perimeter. ‘Hard’ landscaping is a preferred deterrence solution where practicable; that is the incorporation of ‘barrier’ architecture. (Refer 5.5.4).

These recommendations may seem extreme. However, given the ‘high risk-to-incident’ and ‘high consequences’ categories of these behaviours, they are smart and cost-effective risk mitigation solutions to consider.

#### 5.4.3 Application – Signage

Signage will add safety and security value throughout the development’s footprint. Ground plane direction signage is the key to wayfinding knowledge. It should reflect a consistency of style aimed at providing wayfinding confidence, destination (arrival) certainty and access-limiting advice.

Throughout and around the development site, signs should be colour coordinated, legible and visually ‘readable’ to cater for human height differences and should be disability inclusive. International pictorial signage is preferred.

Regular users of the spaces will soon become familiar with signs and their purposes. However, casual, or first-time visitors to the site, will find visually attractive directional (wayfinding) and destination signage helpful and less confusing.

Emergency (including fire and exit) signage is subject to codified compliance. If emergency or ‘help’ points are considered ( 5.5.2), signs should incorporate appropriate contact and response capability.

### CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations

External lighting treatments should:

- (i) support (night-time) surveillance at, and as ‘spill’ along, Wentworth Street and South Steyne entry points, in colour temperature ‘step’ with Council’s roadway lighting initiatives,
- (ii) highlight pedestrian and vehicle entry points,
- (iii) provide wayfinding certainty through the forecourt and other open spaces, to strengthen whole-of-site night-time natural surveillance,



- (iv) continue sympathetic illumination, complementing spill lighting from retail tenancies and entry foyers,
- (v) provide consistent non-movement activated lighting in the basements, at high illuminance to eliminate low light or 'no light' opportunities for concealment or entrapment.

In summary, CPTED lighting aims to:

- (i) illuminate the development site footprint, perimeters and surrounds with (mostly) overhead luminaires to improve night-time wayfinding and surveillance,
- (ii) avoid colour inconsistencies (clashes), and
- (iii) increase minimum lux levels along lighting 'corridor' pathways, in open spaces and around each building's perimeter to highlight vulnerable ground plane areas.

We recommend recessed, targeted and where practicable, overhead LED luminaires (+ - 4000 Kelvin) for pathways, under-eaves and basements, including the loading dock, basement ramp, residential and commercial entrance lobbies. Luminaires should be sufficiently beam-angled to maximise throw, spill and (where appropriate) wash, eliminating, shadowing and dark gaps.

Bollards should not be considered for any external lighting within the development.

Landscaping should:

- (i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings,
- (ii) maximise sightline continuity,
- (iii) prevent the concealment of suspicious packages, and
- (iv) deter potential hostile vehicle access.

Signage should consider first-time and casual visitors, contractors to the site. All signs should be disability inclusive. Strategically selected signage should be back-lit to improve legibility and wayfinding. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development. DD should detail inter-disciplinary solutions.

## 5.5 CPTED Principle 5

### Target Hardening: adding specific and robust architecture and technology

#### General Explanation

Target hardening is often called 'situational' crime prevention. It aims to reinforce other CPTED principles and to proactively 'strengthen' form, infrastructure, structures, fixtures, fittings and furniture in and around identified vulnerable spaces. Target hardening design is an added crime risk defence layer.

Design measures aim to increase the efforts intending offenders must expend attempting to damage property and/or harm or injure people.

Target hardening can apply additional physical, mechanical, structural and electronic treatments to deny or limit access. Electronic alarms or surveillance cameras are the more common target hardening measures. However, the Principle's design goal is to avoid place 'fortressing'.

#### 5.5.1 Application – IP Network (CCTV) Installations

This target hardening measure complements natural surveillance. Technical 'eyes' are becoming the norm to identify offenders and offences but should be applied sparingly, targeting the more vulnerable

spaces. There are two options (i) direct image feeds to security or other nominated security contractors, able to respond from hand-held or proximate devices, and (ii) stored image feeds for later review. Creating and sustaining the development's 'welcoming-and-safe-place' reputation requires (as a minimum) CCTV (IP Network) surveillance technology in the following locations:

- (i) pedestrian and basement entrances, including all lift lobbies,
- (ii) along internal basement ramps and parking bays,
- (iii) the service vehicle zone focusing on unloading, delivery and on waste storage and transfer operations,
- (iv) approaches to ground plane retail and open space areas,
- (v) utilities infrastructure and plant room entrances, focussed on entrance doorways,
- (vi) each street frontage, in conjunction (partnership) with the Council's broader policy.

### 5.5.2 Application – Help Points

Although it may seem an extreme measure, consideration should be given to installing *monitored* help points at key locations within the basements at disable parking bays and lift lobbies, and other vulnerable locations, if deemed necessary.

Help points should be within view of surveillance cameras. The condition of installing help point technology is that the 'feed' would need to go to a terminal or to a portable device, for example a smart phone or tablet.

Illuminated 'help point' signage (under camera surveillance) provides a level of reassurance where people feel, or are, vulnerable, for example within the basements. These signs may also act as a deterrent against anti-social or criminal behaviour in these vulnerable spaces.

### 5.5.3 Application – Building Facades

The building facades are prime targets for 'tagging'. While no masonry coatings can guarantee protection from graffiti damage, we recommend investigating and applying the latest protective material, and/or coatings to minimise likely defacing of the masonry areas. The coating should also facilitate ease of graffiti removal.

Given the high visual 'exposure' and context of the development, the 'it-is-there-and-it-is-new' challenge may still tempt offenders and 'test' security measures. Causing wall or building damage is a relatively easy 'test' option for potential offenders.

Anti-graffiti coatings should be applied to ground floor (level) and any other vulnerable facades.

### 5.5.4 Application – Hostile Vehicle Deterrence

Potential hostile vehicle penetration relates to (a) the site's openness to Wentworth Street and South Steyne and (b) high profile of the RFW address, history and positive reputation. Any unlawful access to ground plane entries and building facades would be concerning.

Planned assaults and/or loss-of-control vehicles impacting people, infrastructure or buildings should be risk-mitigated through barriers, preferably creative landscape options eg sandstone or solid timber elements. Deliberate attempts to target people and property would have catastrophic consequences.

The 'steps option' in the street entry design may not be sufficient to prevent targeted impact, especially if there are only one or two steps proposed.

## CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations

We recommend targeted IP Network (CCTV) camera surveillance of the development footprint's, vulnerable spaces, covering:

- (i) each off-street entry point,
- (ii) the basement ramp-to-roller shutter entry,
- (iii) the loading dock entry door and corridors leading to delivery points,
- (iv) lift lobbies, including at each basement level,
- (v) waste storage and collection points,
- (vi) entrance doorways to plant and utilities rooms,
- (vii) at both sides of the basement roller shutter(s) and covering internal ramping,
- (viii) the public entrances to retail and forecourt spaces.

The location of cameras should deter opportunities for concealment or entrapment and assist with identification.

Deterring and/or preventing potential out-of-control or planned hostile vehicle drivers targeting the development should be a landscaping design element as part of strengthened street fronting 'edges'

Help points should be considered, for the basements, given the 24/7 circulation and activation of those zones.

Anti-graffiti coatings are recommended for all ground floor (level) masonry finishes and to other identified vulnerable facades.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

## 6 Informing Legislation, Policy and or Planning Instruments: Compliance

### 6.1 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979 (as amended)

Consideration of crime prevention for mid to large scale developments in New South derives from Section 4.15 (1) (b) and (e) of the NSW Environment Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act, (as amended).

The Act allows provision for State and local government instruments to regulate or codify issues pertaining to the evaluation of environmental impacts of developments. Social "impacts" (b) and "the public interest" (e) fall within this Section. Under the heading 'Evaluation', Section 4.15 (1) states:

*"In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take into consideration such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development the subject of the development application:*

- (b) the likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality,*
- (c) the suitability of the site for the development,*
- (d) any submissions made in accordance with this Act or the regulations,*
- (e) the public interest."*

In the case of 'green' or 'brown' field developments, interpretation of "the public interest" includes stakeholder proponents, post-development occupants and, by extension, the wider community.

Local Government authorities in NSW are required to consider the various impacts within S.4.15 when evaluating developments. Councils recognise the importance of mitigating anti-social and criminal behaviour within their constituencies. Many have incorporated the CPTED framework into Development

Control Plans and/or Crime Prevention Plans, requiring crime prevention considerations as a specific development consent condition.

The *public interest* interpretation aims to ensure CPTED-relevant architecture creates and promotes 'safe place' outcomes, i.e. to prevent anti-social and/or criminal behaviour which could put at risk people and property associated with a new development footprint.

Ordinarily, the *public interest* is limited to a development footprint. However, public space approaches to, or 'edges' of a development's surrounds, may be considered as an extension of the social and public interest impacts (S.4.15 (b) and (e)).

In our opinion, the proposed development has considered the "social" and "public interest" requirements of this Section and the 2001 regulatory CPTED Guidelines.

## 6.2 Northern Beaches Council

### 6.2.1 Original Concept Approval – Council and NSW Government

The Part 3A Concept Approval Instrument (reference MP10\_0159, Schedule 3, Item 15) outlines the CPTED requirements: "*Future applications shall ensure that design and treatments of the proposed buildings have due regard to the principles of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Guidelines, 2001 and incorporate these principles into the relevant design Stage and should include:*

- (i) *The location of street furniture on streets or in thoroughfares being identified on the plans for each stage. Street furniture shall be positioned to take advantage of well-lit and open areas to minimise crime.*
- (ii) *The landscape design shall provide adequate sight lines and avoid creation of places of concealment within the open space areas.*
- (iii) *Lighting of areas adjacent to public spaces shall be provided in accordance with the AS/NZS 1158.3.1:2005 Lighting for Roads and Public Spaces."*

We note Council's approval of the Section 75W modifications.

### 6.2.2 Development Control Plan (Manly) 2013, Amendment 11

The DCP references matters of safety and security in design, particularly regarding dwellings and public space. These references are under the following headings. They are drawn from CPTED principles.

#### 3.10 Safety and Security

*"Relevant DCP objectives to be met in relation to these paragraphs include the following:*

*Objective 1) To ensure all development are safe and secure for all residents, occupants and visitors of various ages and abilities.*

*Objective 2) To ensure that the design process for all development integrate principles of 'Safety in Design' to eliminate or minimise risk to safety and security.*

*Objective 2) To contribute to the safety and security of the public domain."*

#### 3.10.2 Security (Casual Surveillance)

*"In order to promote safety and security, all development is to be designed to maximise opportunities for passive surveillance of public and communal areas by:*

- a) orientating some rooms to the street;*
- b) providing sight lines to the street frontage from the window(s) of at least one habitable room unobscured by trees or any other object;*
- c) ensuring the design of fences, walls and landscaping minimise opportunities for concealment and encourage social interaction; and*
- d) preferring double glazing on windows in areas of high street noise rather than the high fences or walls as a sound attenuation measure."*

### 6.2.3 Community Safety – Strategic Directions Group Directions Paper 2017

This Paper references the need for safe social interaction and community wellbeing by recommending that CPTED guidelines be incorporated into the design of residential and public spaces.

### 6.2.4 Norther Beaches Community Safety Plan 2021 - 2026

The plan notes that “*more than 78% of residents live within 400m of an open space*”. Designing-Out-Crime is the Plan’s CPTED focus for all Northern Beaches open space. The development’s public open space access is a small but important example of Council’s intent.

*“Council incorporates the international standard of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles into all council development and infrastructure projects, including the planning and design of open places and spaces. The application of these principles increases the passive security of spaces, the difficulty of crime and antisocial behaviour occurring within those areas, and the feeling of safety in CPTED designed zones.”*

### 6.3 Northern Beaches Police Area Command – CPTED Check List

The NSW Police Force has appointed crime prevention officers (CPOs) to most of the State’s Area and District Commands. Their role is to proactively: (a) review anti-social and criminal behaviour ‘hot spots’ with a view to risk mitigation through increased police or security presence and/or (b) advocate situational crime prevention measures; that is physical modification of (usually) external built form and public space by applying CPTED principles.


We have discussed our assessed crime risks to the development (Section 3.1) with the CPO at Northern Beaches Police Area Command, who agrees that the site’s centrality to existing known risk streets and premises, presents an additional vulnerability. Our assessed risks, CPTED analyses, conclusions and recommendations are ‘realistic’ given the CPO’s comments, BOCSAR data and our familiarity with the development’s context.

The Police have developed their own CPTED (or Safer-By-Design) guidelines as a ‘Check List’ which was revised in 2020. Relevant items in the Check List have been reviewed. This report has been undertaken with reference to those relevant items.

### 6.4 International Standards Informing CPTED Principles and Applications

There are no (crime) risk and mitigation absolutes or guarantees. However, there are two International Standards relevant to the application of CPTED. ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*, provides a helpful framework to identify and manage any organisational risks, include crime risks.

A more recently, and relevant, gazetted Standard is ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. It provides a CPTED framework, illustrated as:



### Instrument Compliance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

We are of the view that reviewed drawings of the proposed RFW development at 14 – 22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne Manly NSW are consistent with CPTED principles and their application as required by:

- (i) legislation and/or regulations and crime prevention guidelines derived from Section 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended,
- (ii) the Development Control Plan (2013) and Community Safety Plan (2021 – 2026) of the Northern Beaches Council,
- (iii) the NSW Police Crime Prevention (Safer-By-Design) Checklist – Revision 2020.

We conclude that, subject to intentional application of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, the reviewed drawings support consent by the Northern Beaches Council, as that consent relates to fulfilling CPTED conditions.

## OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

### Application of CPTED Principles and Informing Instrument Compliance

In our professional opinion, the Development Application for the Royal Far West Pty Ltd development at 14 – 22 Wentworth Street and 19-21 South Steyne Manly NSW, has considered, or will consider, CPTED principles and their application, as assessed, affirmed or recommended in this report, prior to 90+% design development and design detail sign-off.

In compliance terms, the development's incorporation of CPTED principles adheres to the State Government's 'social impact' and 'public interest' requirements, under Section 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended, and with the Act's regulatory guidelines.



It also complies with requirements of Northern Beaches Council's Community Safety Plan 2021-2026 and Council's Development Control Plan, 2013 Amendment 11.

The development has been referenced against, and complies with, relevant sections of the NSW Police Safer-By-Design (CPTED) Guidelines (2020).

Harris Crime Prevention Services is also of the view that the proposed development should make a positive crime prevention contribution to Northern Beaches Council's broader 'community safety' objectives. The development's CPTED-applied architecture could 'showcase' future 'welcoming-and-safe-place' developments promoted and/or approved by the Council.

## 7 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Management

Although not part of the consultancy brief, Harris Crime Prevention Services strongly encourages an on-going oversight of 'welcoming-and-safe-place' security. For client consideration, Harris has developed CPTM as a framework to complement and support CPTED initiatives.

The framework may be applied to most large mixed-use, single purpose and public realm sites and precincts. It would be implemented by facilities managers, building/site managers and/or security contractors in cooperation with stakeholder owners, operators, residents, tenants, contractors, councils and local police.

Over time, the purposes of developed built form, including public realm, may change. This in turn may lead to design and physical modifications. CPTED and CPTM would therefore require review to ensure original crime prevention objectives are not compromised.

Harris believes that ad hoc and/or intermittent attention to CPTM can negate CPTED's effectiveness and can leave stakeholders exposed to harm or litigation in the event of threats or incidents occurring within premises or precincts.

Harris also believes that CPTED and CPTM are interdependently linked. CPTED is intentionally integrated with concept, master planning and design development briefs. CPTM is focused on post-construction operational 'safe-place' objectives and outcomes.

Harris has identified five CPTM principles.

- |             |                           |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Principle 1 | Design Maintenance        |
| Principle 2 | Systems Management        |
| Principle 3 | Crime Risk Mitigation     |
| Principle 4 | Incident Responses        |
| Principle 5 | Monitoring and Evaluating |

### Principle 1 Design Maintenance

Most physical and mechanical CPTED installations require regular maintenance. Lights, signs, landscaping, security doors, gates, fences and locks should receive scheduled maintenance and appraisal to affirm (design) purpose, capability and integrity. Repairs and/or replacements should be undertaken immediately when failures are identified.

## **Principle 2      Systems Management**

This involves the testing and management of security technology systems to ensure site-wide security and safety operational readiness. This includes physical (electronic) access control, alarm and IP Network (CCTV) surveillance systems. Regular scheduled testing for reliability, obsolescence, redundancy, replacement and re-alignment is essential, in some cases even mandatory.

Maintaining the integrity of security systems is also critical, when they are integrated with fire and emergency systems.

## **Principle 3      Crime Risk Mitigation**

Practical security awareness procedures should be developed to engage steward-stakeholders – owner-operators, security contractors, facilities and/or site managers of retail, residential, recreational, commercial, health, educational, industrial, transport and public realm premises and precincts.

Procedures could be similar to emergency, general office or body-corporate procedures. They should be understandable and practical.

Where warranted and practical, there should be scheduled ‘desktop’ crime risk assessments to build and manage ‘risk-change’ and risk mitigation options.

## **Principle 4      Incident Responses**

There are occasions when a ‘what-to-do-in-the event-of...’ scenario occurs.

Knowing how to identify and respond to anti-social and criminal incidents is critical.

Security, facilities, site/building managers should develop and ‘rehearse’ responses covering the most common major or minor categories. Incident recording and reporting should be (i) factual, (ii) relevant, (iii) accurate, (iv) clear and (v) concise.

## **Principle 5      Monitoring and Evaluating**

Implementation of CPTED and CPTM requires on-going regular monitoring and evaluation; to ‘test’ and share the relevance, cost-effectiveness and value (real and perceived) of both frameworks. This should lead to improving future security design (CPTED) and security management (CPTM) outcomes. It may also mean that successful CPTED and CPTM measures can be replicated and/or ‘modelled’ for future developments.

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## **8 References**

Concept Approval Instrument (reference MP10\_0159, Schedule 3, Item 15),

Jane Irwin Landscape Architecture, Landscape Drawings Rev. A, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2022,

Murcutt Candalepas Preliminary Architectural Drawings, Issue P11 – P15, January 2022,

Murcutt Candalepas Amended Architectural Drawings, Issue P31,

Murcutt Candalepas, DA Architectural Drawings, DA 1, April 2022,



Northern Beaches Council, *Community Safety Strategic Reference Group Directions Paper*, version 2.0 draft 29 June 2017,

Northern Beaches Council, *Community Safety Plan, 2021 – 2026*,

Northern Beaches Council, *Manly Development Control Plan*, 2013,

NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Crime Statistics for the suburb of Manly NSW*, October 2016 – September 2021,

NSW Department of Planning and Environment, *Section 4.15, (b) and (e) Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended*,

NSW Police, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Safer-By-Design) 'Check List'*, Revision 2020,

Reynald, Danielle M, *Guardians on Guardianship: Factors affecting the Willingness to Supervise, the Ability to Detect Potential Offenders & the Willingness to Intervene*, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 2010,

Royal Far West, *Client Brief, Campus Development, Revision 6* (undated).  
Standard ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*,

Standard ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*,

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## 9 Appendices 1 to 3

### APPENDIX 1 CRIME STATISTICS FOR THE SUBURB OF MANLY NSW

The following crime statistics are supplied by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. They are indicative of reported crime only and can only be taken as a guide to actual crime occurring in Manly over the (reported) 5-year period, October 2016 – September 2021.

NSW Crime Statistics October 2016 to September 2021 Manly (Suburb)											
	5 Year Trend to September 2021	Year to Sept 2017 Count	Year to Sept 2017 Rate	Year to Sept 2018 Count	Year to Sept 2018 Rate	Year to Sept 2019 Count	Year to Sept 2019 Rate	Year to Sept 2020 Count	Year to Sept 2020 Rate	Year to Sept 2021 Count	Year to Sept 2021 Rate
Homicide	n.c.	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Assault - domestic	n.c.	19	108.5	38	215.1	38	213.5	38	213.4	35	196.5
Assault - non Domestic	Down 10.3% per year	214	1222.3	171	968.4	193	1086.0	138	774.9	141	791.7
Sexual assault	n.c.	13	74.4	17	96.3	8	45.1	6	33.7	16	89.8
Sexual touching, sexual act and other sexual offences	n.c.	21	119.9	19	107.6	18	101.3	23	129.1	23	129.1
Robbery without weapon	n.c.	8	45.6	7	39.6	6	33.7	5	28.1	3	16.8
Robbery with a firearm	n.c.	0	0.0	1	5.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Robbery with weapon not a firearm	n.c.	0	0.0	1	5.7	2	11.2	1	5.6	3	16.8
Intimidation , stalking & harassment	Up 21.2% per year	31	176.7	53	300.1	52	292.5	60	336.9	68	381.8
Other offences against the person	n.c.	7	39.9	2	11.3	3	16.9	3	16.8	4	22.5
Break & enter dwelling	Down 8.2% per year	36	205.5	52	294.9	37	208.2	21	117.9	26	146.0
Break & enter non dwelling	n.c.	22	125.6	22	124.7	14	78.9	16	89.8	8	44.9
Motor vehicle theft	n.c.	30	171.5	22	124.7	24	135.0	15	84.2	16	89.8
Steal from motor vehicle	Stable	54	308.4	64	362.5	67	376.7	54	303.2	60	336.9
Steal from retail store	Down 18.7% per year	110	629.5	90	509.8	99	556.6	41	230.2	49	275.1
Steal from dwelling	Down 9.5% per year	60	342.8	67	379.6	52	292.7	42	235.8	41	230.2
Steal from person	n.c.	41	234.5	37	209.5	21	118.1	22	123.5	12	67.4
Liquor offences	Down 9.4% per year	188	1073.6	141	798.3	119	669.6	113	634.5	129	724.4
Disorderly conduct	Down 20.7% per year	238	1361.3	168	951.1	159	894.9	82	460.4	96	539.1
Disorderly Conduct (criminal intent)	n.c.	4	22.7	4	22.6	5	28.1	2	11.2	4	22.5
Disorderly conduct (trespass)	n.c.	28	160.4	30	169.8	42	236.2	19	106.7	22	123.5
Disorderly conduct (offensive conduct)	Down 24.1% per year	148	847.2	94	532.3	81	455.9	44	247.1	50	280.8
Drug offences	Stable	102	584.1	115	651.2	102	573.9	85	477.3	106	595.2
Malicious damage to property	Down 7.7% per year	164	936.4	163	923.4	167	939.2	141	791.7	121	679.4
Prohibited and regulated weapons offences	n.c.	22	125.6	16	90.5	30	168.7	27	151.6	28	157.2
Arson	n.c.	3	17.1	5	28.3	2	11.3	6	33.7	3	16.8

## APPENDIX 2 THE RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD

While there are absolutes or guarantees around risk and risk mitigation, the International Standard - ISO 31000:2018 provides a helpful framework to identify and manage *any* organisational risks, including crime risks.

Identifying and mitigating crime risks, incident likelihood and potential consequences is a legitimate adaptation and application of the Standard. The Standard provides a theoretical and practical framework whereby contexts, risks, threats, incidents and consequences can be identified and managed.

The Standard defines generic risk as... “*the effect (impact) of uncertainty on objectives*” (ISO 31000 Clause 2.1). The Standard’s objective is to identify and remove or manage the uncertainty so as not to negatively impact on organisational objectives.

Harris has adapted and applied the Standard by defining potential risks-to-incidents within a **context**, assessing **the likelihood of crime categories** and affirming and/or recommending appropriate CPTED treatment to mitigate that likelihood.

The collective term ‘**risk**’ has been more widely defined as: ...*‘the likelihood of something untoward happening and the consequence(s) if one or more risks become threats or incidents.’*

Threats and incidents are progressive in their definitions. If risks remain unidentified and untreated (unmanaged), they can rapidly and easily become threats or incidents.

A ‘**threat**’ may be defined as *‘unacceptable and escalating behaviour stemming from one or more ‘uncontrolled’ risks, which if not urgently managed, is likely to lead to harm or damage with negative consequences or outcomes.’*

An ‘**incident**’ may be defined as *‘an uncontained threat with likely negative harm or damage consequences.’*

### 2.1 An Adapted (Crime Incident) Identification and Behaviour Matrix

CPTED solutions should ‘match’ the (Harris adapted) assessed risk-to-incident behaviours. Recommendations and/or affirmation of architectural solutions should be considered (proposed) against this backdrop. The table identifies typical incident behaviours and potential consequences which may apply to this development.

<i>Low Crime Incidents and Potential Consequences</i>	disturbances, intimidation, and aggressive behaviour towards individuals or groups; graffiti and other minor property damage to the façades or street fixtures, fittings, paving, luminaires, plantings and signage.
<i>Moderate Crime Incidents and Potential Consequences</i>	escalating intimidating or threatening behaviour leading to assault, and/or damage to personal property; unauthorised access, damage to and/or theft of property from the building, vehicles and/or vehicle theft
<i>High Crime Incidents and Potential Consequences</i>	‘moderate’ crime is escalated to intentional (planned) personal harm and /or damage to building facades and structures and/or property including plant and associated utilities infrastructure
<i>Extreme Crime Incidents and Potential Consequences</i>	immediate and dangerous threats to people and/or property, including the building and contents, vehicles, and/or nearby structures and/or utilities infrastructure, including bomb threats and hostile vehicle penetration

It is important to note that ‘consequences’ cannot be readily determined. Even low (level) crimes can have serious or catastrophic consequences.

## APPENDIX 3 THE INFLUENCE OF CPTED IN RE-DESIGNING PUBLIC SPACES FOR SAFE AND 'LIVEABLE' ACTIVATION

### 3.1 Preventing Crime in Urban Public Spaces

The question of activating and sharing large or small urban public spaces has been occupying city planners globally for the past 40 + years. Prior to 'motorism' public spaces were primarily for pedestrians in major cities, towns and centres. The immediate general question is whether public spaces can and should be designed or re-designed to accommodate the contemporary emphasis on pedestrianisation. Obviously, the answer depends on historic and existing use, and the willingness of stakeholders to change the use.

In this Century, urban public space renewal and re-sharing is becoming a priority. Vehicle take-overs are being challenged by governments, corporations and communities. Pedestrianisation is making its collective presence felt.

There are many reputable architects and planners in numerous countries helping facilitate the urban space-occupancy challenges. Prominent among them is Jan Gehl, a world-renowned architect who, for the past 50+ years has devoted his career, professionally and passionately, to raising issues and solutions for small and large public precinct renewal.

Gehl has written compellingly on (public) spatial sharing versus separation - defining and designing for both options. His research has concluded overwhelmingly that people should re-claim city, town and suburban spaces.

*"It's no secret that we have always built cities for people until cars started to invade our lives. So by studying old cities you can get a lot of inspiration for what would also be a good solution for today by looking at people more than we look at making the cars happy." (Gehl 2015)*

The added contemporary element in urban reclamation and renewal is *security (crime prevention)*, an all-too-broad a word with many confusing interpretations. CPTED interprets 'security' through design, harnessing architecture and/or engineering to collaboratively *reduce or prevent* anti-social and criminal behaviour.

Harris defines this collaboration to provide 'welcoming and safe (secure) place' as: *'built form and public space environments where crime prevention has been a consideration of concept, master-planning, design development and construction processes and where safe place outcomes enhance a community's overall reputation'*.

CPTED is also referred to as designing-out-crime and/or safer-by-design, defined by Harris as *'applying aspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals as an intentional environmental crime prevention strategy'*. CPTED is a globally recognised designing-out-crime framework. It is our preferred framework for these projects.

### 3.2 The Influence of CPTED on Community Safety

CPTED's application to, and influence on, urban community safety has a 40+ year track record. Published books and papers began from CPTED's emergence in the 1970s.

Liggett (2004) quotes Greenberg, Rohe and Brantingham and Brantingham in that historical context.:

*"The design of the built environment can affect crime through its effect on the degree of access, ease of entrance and exit, and surveillability (Greenberg and Rohe, 1984). For example, alleys and mid-block connections increase the number of escape routes, open a block or a neighborhood to exploration, and aggravate the criminal risk for residential or commercial establishments (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993).*

Kennedy (1993):

*"While there have been several notable exceptions (eg Rand, 1983, 1984), most architectural literature pertaining to security deals primarily with the immediate physical structure itself. Criminogenic aspects of the physical environment have not been routinely selected for analysis by design teams... As professional architecture continues to evolve, however, the profession must incorporate those findings of other disciplines which relate so directly to its mission of creating a safe environment."*

Contemporary Korean criminologists Jae Seung Lee, Sungjin Park, and Sanghoon Jung (2016) observe:

*"Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is one of the most popular urban planning strategies for improving safety in cities. The major purpose of CPTED is to deter potential criminals by modifying urban environments. It is based on the urban design and environmental psychology belief that human behaviour can be*

*influenced by the surrounding environment. CPTED is often used to renovate declining neighbourhoods that suffer from crime."*

CPTED principles should be applied where there is a *primary* intention to create re-development 'attractors' aimed at bringing people into separate or shared social gathering spaces where CPTED supports architecture and engineering in promoting safe activation, reducing or preventing anti-social behaviour and the likelihood of crime.

CPTED is therefore best applied when safe people spaces are the goal, either in the absence of vehicles or at the very least, where vehicle flow and parking are separately defined.

Definitional clarity of place purpose, activation and circulation will determine the application and potential benefits of CPTED in both centres. CPTED emphasises 'welcoming and safe place' in a potentially 24/7 activation environment.

The five CPTED principles – territorial definition, natural surveillance, access control, activity support and target hardening – have informed this report's assessment, conclusions and recommendations.

**SUMMARY: CPTED PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE APPLIED WHEN SPACES AND PLACES ARE IDENTIFIED, SEPARATED OR SHARED AND DESIGNED FOR STAKEHOLDER-AGREED PURPOSE(S) WITH AN EMPHASIS ON PEOPLE AND PROPERTY PROTECTION (COMMUNITY SAFETY AND/OR SECURITY).**